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Introduction 
Sustainable development is widely accepted paradigm – in theory it the reconciliation of 
environmental, social and economic concerns seems common sense. Yet, the reality does not reflect 
this objective.  
Not least the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and its follow-ups document the 
general commitment to foster sustainable development. However, this commitment cannot be 
regarded as sufficiently translated to action since actual results of the three “columns” are 
unsatisfactory. The global norm does not reach the local level. 
The discrepancy between global decisions and local implementation in the field of sustainable 
development is illustrated in this paper. For this purpose, the South African ‘National Framework for 
Sustainable Development’ is analysed in order to determine why implementation is not successful. 
Two possible explanations – veto player theory and the lack of capacity – are applied. Veto player 
theory examines the possibility of policy reform as a result of the structure of partisan, institutional 
and other veto players (Tsebelis 2000, 2002). Also, a lack of capacity (financial and human resources, 
information, cooperation capacities) can hinder implementation even if responsible actors are 
supportive of the norm. In the emerging market South Africa sustainable development policy-making 
might face both obstacles, while the latter is likely to be more severe in economically less stable 
countries.  
In addition to the analysis of the obstacles, it is asked which impact the business sector has since it is 
in a crucial position concerning economic, social and environmental developments and companies 
have been integrating more and more “corporate sustainability” programmes into their own 
strategies over the course of the past years.  
The paper is structured as follows: First the term of sustainable development as a global norm is 
summarized; then we propose an approach to analyse the translation of this global norm into 
national policy-making. Possible action of the business sector is outlined and a brief case study of the 
South African sustainable development strategy follows.  
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Sustainable Development as a global norm 
Following the adoption of the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit) in 1992, sustainable development has become a 
key word for international policy-makers. It is included in numerous agendas, agreements and 
frameworks and has motivated the foundation of various committees and working groups. Although 
the term’s use has dramatically increased, the concept of sustainable development as such remains 
imprecise with regard to its exact meaning. Definitions have been widely discussed and criticized. The 
concept as such has been regarded as too vague, allowing for divergent interpretations. An exact 
idea of how to cover the three elements meant to be combined in sustainable development policies 
– economic, environmental and social factors – has not been established (see for an overview e.g.: 
Lafferty 2000: 9-13). Still, this meaning as the integration of environmental, social and economic 
development can be considered a consensual minimal definition and it has become more than the 
intuitive understanding of the term.  
 
Irrespective of the criticism that the concept is just another policy prescription according to the 
understanding of the developed world vis-à-vis developing countries, sustainable development has 
become an indispensable term in the global arena. In the past 20 years sustainable development 
agendas, although varying in wording, have been adopted by governments and other policy-makers. 
The European Union, for instance, as a regional actor and global player, has included the sustainable 
development objective into its treaties and has a Sustainable Development Strategy, which was 
renewed in 2006 and reviewed in 2009 (COM 2009). Also, the World Trade Organization’s founding 
agreement and following documents contain the principle of sustainable development. Economic 
factors are meant to support social development while “seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so” (WTO 1995). The United Nation, as the most 
inclusive international organisation, has integrated the sustainability approach into its policies since 
the Rio Declaration was adopted (UNGA 1992). The Commission for Sustainable Development 
supports the “integration of social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development in policy-making at international, regional and national levels” (DSD 2010). In addition 
to these and various other international institutions, like OECD and World Bank, national agendas 
and frameworks have integrated the goal of sustainable development.  
Hence, despite debates and criticism on its exact definition, policy-making fostering sustainable 
development has become a practice which is widely considered adequate. As behaviour regarded as 
appropriate for policy-makers, sustainable development can be seen as a global norm (see for theory 
on norms e.g. Finnemore 1996; Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; March/Olsen 2006). Although, different 
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from Finnemore and Sikkink’s analysis (1998: 898), the norm of sustainable governance is genuinely 
global and has not emerged from the national level, we can assume it at the state of internalisation 




A global norm going national? 
The majority of states regard the concept of sustainable development as appropriate. Government 
actors appear to have internalised it on the global level, it has reached the national level and it has 
been integrated in national strategies (Dalal-Clayton et al. 1996; Jörgens 2004; Lafferty 2000, 2004). 
However, the acceptance of the concept has not led to corresponding results and it has not been 
sufficiently translated into actual policy-making. None of the three elements has been sustainably 
advanced. Many countries could not improve their economic situation. In addition, economic 
inequalities have increased despite of trade expansion which had originally been regarded as a key 
instrument for a global “positive-sum game”. Correspondingly, social development has not been 
realized: Inequalities within countries have been increasing and poverty alleviation has not been 
successful. Including after the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals, progress can at 
most be considered mixed (UN 2010). Lastly, the global environmental picture is likewise sad. Climate 
change becomes more and more acute and mitigation initiatives are far from promising serious 
remedy (IPCC 2007). In addition, policies hardly exist that coherently integrate these elements in 
order to promote comprehensive sustainable development. 
 
One problematic aspect of sustainable development lies in its nature: It is a global concept and the 
goal itself is genuinely global but the actual measures to reach the goal cannot be taken at a global 
scale. The norm has to be transported to national or local level policy-making where public policy 
reforms can be conducted.  
  
A way to explain the probability of policy reform is to examine the policy arena with regard to veto 
players (Tsebelis 2000, 2002)
2
. According to Tsebelis, individual and collective actors have to agree to 
a proposed change before it can be realized in the political system. For the purpose of analysing 
these actors, Tsebelis identifies institutional, partisan and other veto players. These actors stem from 
parameters laid out in the constitution or from features of the political system. Hence, a president or 
parliament chambers (institutional) as well as the different parties and their coalitions (partisan) are 
veto players. In addition, he speaks of possible other veto players like the judiciary, the central bank, 
                                                 
1
  Stages in the life cycle comprise norm emergence, norm cascade, norm internalization. 
2
  For a case study example see e.g.: Merkel (2003). 
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the military, interest groups or options like referenda. These veto players are decisive for policy 
stability which is defined as the impossibility for significant change of the status quo. In other words, 
the reform capacity of a country depends on the structure of veto players. The possibility of political 
change is smaller: 1. the higher the number of veto players; 2. the lower the policy congruence, i.e. 
the higher the ideological distance among the veto players; 3. the higher the internal cohesion of a 
collective veto player. In addition, he formulates an “absorption rule” which means that veto players 
and their blocking potential are absorbed e.g. when the government party is also the majority in 
parliament. After analysing all these factors – the number of veto players, absorption, policy 
congruence and internal cohesion – the reform probability can be predicted. 
 
Concerning the introduction and implementation of national sustainable development strategies, 
different veto players influence the process and outcome. First of all, decision-making can be 
challenged by partisan veto players when parties represent different views on the topic and share 
power, e.g. in a bicameral system. Also in the decision-making process, executive and legislative 
actors might have certain institutional powers (right of initiative, vetoes etc.) that can hinder 
introduction. However, even after introducing a strategy similar arrangements can impede effective 
implementation. Especially sustainable development, representing a cross-sectional topic, might 
provoke different and even competing attitudes of departments and administrations on different 
levels. Rival agendas of various institutional and other veto players might impede effective realization 
of sustainable development strategies. 
 
However, in addition to veto players, other factors might also be responsible for the lack of policy 
change. Reforms might be unrealised not because decisive actors are unwilling to reform but 
because they are not capable to do so. This is essentially a question of governance capacity as the 
necessary connection between the regime or the corresponding internalised norm and actual 
implementation. This lack of capacity is especially found in areas of limited statehood
3
 
(Risse/Lehmkuhl 2006). Even if political actors or veto players are in favor of certain policies, they 
might lack the ability to enforce political decisions (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2006: 4). Hence, a lack of 
capability might be another reason why governments do not implement certain policies even though 
they have shown general support at the global level. Institutions, or the lack of effective institutions, 
can therefore become a veto player in the sense of veto by incapacity – irrespective of a meta-
                                                 
3
  “[T]he term ”areas of limited statehood” covers ”failed/failing states” in the crisis regions of the world, 
”weak states” in developing and transition societies and many of the so-called ”newly industrializing 
countries” (NICs) if they are not able to effectively enforce a monopoly on the use of force and 
implement authoritative decisions throughout the state.” Risse/Lehmkuhl (2006: 5). 
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normative willingness. The question of reform probability gets another aspect in addition to 
willingness-veto players.  
 
This capacity challenge is then constituted by a several aspects, such as in the first place the lack of 
financial resources to implement and or monitor certain policies, invest in necessary infrastructure 
and bring about the programmatic change needed for sustainable development (Schwartz 2003). 
This also points to the question of the respective source of financial resources and whether these are 
procured through tax collection, rents or in cases of many developing countries, external 
development aid (SFB 700 2010). The availability of these resources and the degree to which the 
state is capable of allocating and assigning these towards sustainable development is also decisive in 
discussing the uptake of global norms. 
Furthermore in discussing effective institutions, we need to discuss the potential lack of human 
resources capacity, i.e. sufficient training and understanding to address emerging challenges. 
Especially with regards to sustainable development, the complexity of the tasks requires significant 
skill and knowledge, but also the capability to effectively liaise and cooperate with a broad range of 
actors (Kranz 2010). 
This hints to two additional aspects that constitute capacity. In the first place, information resources 
allow for effectively assessing a situation, defining the status-quo and designing development 
trajectories accordingly. 
And finally, it is necessary to consider the capacity to engage and interact with a broad range of 
actors, facilitate consensus and a commonly shared vision. This links back to the considerations with 
regard to veto players. While veto payers might exist, engaging those who oppose and facilitating a 
mutual exchange might contribute to overcoming or weakening their veto position (Börzel 2010). 
 
New modes of governance? 
Assuming that not all reform failure can be attributed to a lack in willingness or interest of certain 
veto players but also to a capability or resource veto, the question arises if other actors step in and 
function as alternative governance entrepreneurs. These actors can both compensate for material 
incapacities as well as bypass institutional and political veto players.
4
  
In fact, van Zeijl-Rozema at al. (2008) argue for the case of sustainable development, that the 
multitude of challenges, the inherent complexities and issues that need to be addressed in a 
concerted way, the support and contribution of non-state actors is inevitable, thus introducing 
sustainable development as a showcase for new modes of governance. 
                                                 
4
  This can certainly provoke questions of legitimacy.  
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This statement then triggers two additional questions, which a.) pertain to the type of actors 
involved and b.) to the mode of interaction, which actually guides this involvement. 
 
Possible alternative governance actors can be found in the business sector. Having influence on all 
three elements of the “triple bottom line” – environmental, social and economic development – 
businesses are crucial with respect to sustainable development. Also, businesses might be able to 
close the material resource gap where governments are unable to finance certain policy changes.  
The role of business with regards to sustainable development is however rather contested or 
ambiguous at best. There are many instances where business behavior and rationale has proven 
detrimental to at least one pillar of the sustainable development paradigm (Bansal 2002). Business is 
usually perceived as a problem in the sustainability context, with digressions ranging from 
environmental pollution and degradation to social exploitation and human rights violations. 
At the same time, there is evidence and a burgeoning body of literature on positive contributions of 
business to sustainable development (Elkington 1998; Laszlo 2003). It is increasingly argued that 
business is in a unique position to play a particular role in promoting sustainable development due to 
its innovative potential in terms of developing new technologies, its outreach through global markets 
and last but not least its financial leverage. Firms thus also increasingly engage in the provision of 
public goods, going beyond traditional profit-maximizing behavior, while still performing successfully 
on competitive markets (Bleischwitz 2003; Gunningham et al. 2002). 
 
Generally, the business sector has an ambiguous but decisive role: Business can either have a 
damaging impact on social and environmental development or positively contribute to sustainable 
development. Hence, the question of the actual impact is essentially empirical. Taking into account 
the shortcomings in sustainable development, case studies can help to identify the actual impact of 
business practices and explore possibilities and limits of these alternative actors. 
 
The case: South Africa 
Case selection logics 
The question of sustainable development governance is analysed for the case of South Africa. As this 
country is an emerging market it has greater capacities compared to many developing countries and 
fragile states. Problems that are associated with incapacities in the field of policy making can 
therefore be expected in an even stronger dimension in less consolidated countries.  
It is examined according to veto player theory to identify political and institutional veto players in the 
process of realizing a sustainable development agenda. In addition, it will be asked if hindrances due 
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to a lack of capacity influence the process. Finally, alternative governance actors might come into 
play. 
 
South Africa’s state 
South Africa is often referred to as the African economic giant. In terms of business, political and 
economic ratings, South Africa ranks top among other African countries and well within the peer 
group of other emerging economies, such as Brazil, China and India (Hughes 2006). The country had a 
steady economic growth over the past years (between 3 and 5.5 %) until the global financial crisis 
also hit South Africa by the end of 2008 (Campbell 2009). At the same time, South Africa is still one of 
the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution, as demonstrated by a high 
Gini coefficient of 0.64
5
. This inequality prevails in spite of government initiatives to address both the 
challenge to reintroduce South Africa into the global economy and to reduce economic inequality 
after the collapse of the apartheid government (Pycroft 2000).  
The first initiative, the so-called Reconstruction and Development Programme, was soon replaced, 
while not officially discontinued, with GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), which 
foresaw greater economic growth through improved international competitiveness
6
 (Nattrass 1999). 
The achievements of GEAR however have been considerably disappointing; the targets such as GDP 
and export growth and the reduction of the budget deficit were largely missed. One of the most 
problematic failures however was the loss of millions of jobs, resulting in an unemployment rate of 
up to 40 % by 2002. Black South Africans were more affected by unemployment than the white 
population; rural areas were more struck by the negative consequences than urban areas. Even 
though South Africa is considered an upper-middle income country with a per capita GDP of around 
3.900 (1998 dollars), one finds significant levels of food insecurity and poverty, particularly among 
the black population.  
Weighing in heavily on the development potential of the country is furthermore the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic leading to the highest prevalence of the disease worldwide (about 25 % for adults in 2001). 
Resulting in a considerable shortening of life expectancy, the disease is impacting negatively on 
human capital in terms of the availability of skilled labor for industry as well as the public sector (Van 
Aardt 2002). Hughes (2006) argues that the effects of the pandemic might even aggravate South 
Africa’s second largest issue: the high incidence of crime (DEAT 2008), which is compromising social 
security and thus stifling development, particularly in the rapidly growing informal settlements 
                                                 
5
  The Gini coefficient denotes income equality. While 0 represents perfect income equality; 1 represents a 
situation of perfect inequality in income distribution. 
6
  It also proclaimed the promotion of private investment, increased privatization as well as a reduced 
overall budget deficit, fiscal discipline and labor-market flexibility. It thus reduced government 
intervention and forbore government’s ability to influence poverty reduction and income distribution. 
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(Hamann 2008). Besides these obvious weaknesses of the South African state in the areas of stable 
and equitable poverty eradication, the provision of sustainable human settlements, and the combat 
against HIV/AIDS, other problems occur with regards to a stable and affordable supply of energy and 
the maintenance of key municipal infrastructure (Lawless 2007), let alone keeping-up the skill level 
necessary to address and manage these challenges. 
Sustainable Development in South Africa 
Corresponding to the outlined economic and social weaknesses, Patrick Bond and his co-authors 
examine the at times deeply unsustainable practices followed in South Africa in the pre and post 
apartheid period (Bond/Vogel 2002). The authors cite inadequate access to water and other services, 
unsustainable modes of energy production, neoliberal tendencies with regards to granting access to 
services and overreliance on foreign donors and their growth paradigms as symptoms for this 
unsustainable approach. 
While unsustainable practices prevail in the country and are partly aggravated by major global 
trends, such as climate change and globalization (DEAT 2008), the paradigm of sustainable 
development has been strongly received as a discourse in South Africa since democratization. 
Sustainability as a norm is widely accepted and supported. Not only is the concept enshrined in the 
constitution
7
, but the National Environmental Management Act contains a clear commitment to 
sustainable development as well (Fig 2007). In addition to the general internalization of the norm, 
the awareness prevails that local implementation is essential for any realization of sustainable 
development. The concepts of Local Agenda 21
8
 have been formally adopted by the South African 
government, highlighting the role of the local dimension (Urquhart/Atkinson 2000)
9
. As a reaction to 
its commitment to paragraph 162 of the JPOI South Africa embarked on the development of a 
                                                 
7
   At the core of the legislative apparatus in South Africa is the most fundamental legal provision, the Bill 
of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996). Among other rights it foresees 
a fair and sustainable management of South Africa’s natural resources through the promotion of 
ownership and empowerment of the people and is therefore often used as a reference for policies 
documents in relation to sustainable development. Specifically, Section 24 of the Bill of Rights 
guarantees environmental rights to all people of South Africa by stating the following: Everyone has the 
right: to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the environment 
protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development..." 
8
   Local Agenda 21 is an international program for the implementation of sustainability in local 
government. This program emerged from the Rio Summit in 1992 and involves strategic community 
based planning for development and the involvement of communities in decision-making through local 
level partnerships (Urquhart and Atkinson, 2000). 
9
   While these commitments reflect the international discourse in the 1980/1990,  the concept received 
further momentum in the country with South Africa hosting the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, which resulted in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The plan comprises 37 
targets for reaching sustainable development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. 
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National Strategy for Sustainable Development. An intermediate step in the process unfolding was a 
National Framework for Sustainable Development (NFSD) (DEAT 2006, 2008). The NFSD, in its first 
version of 2008, intended to form a basis for progress with regards to concerted action across all 
spheres of government and other social partners. The framework furthermore sought to integrate 
sustainability considerations with the overall development discourse and spell out the national vision 
for sustainable development (DEAT 2008)
10
. Accordingly, in the South African understanding, the 
term ‘sustainable development’ is determined by some distinctive features, which reflect the 
country’s specific development challenges. The NFSD details guiding principles and derives priority 





However, the actual realization of the Framework is confronted with problems, including with regard 
to necessary institutional mechanisms, planning, communication and monitoring measures. Several 
institutions have come into play as veto players as it proved to be very difficult to gain sufficient buy-
in across various government departments. Already at an early stage these actors inhibited a 
comprehensive realization which led to the initial issuance of a framework rather than a full strategy 
(Fig 2007). Furthermore, the NFSD would have to be integrated with other development related 
strategies at the national and province levels making it necessary for numerous veto players to 
approve of the implementation. At the national level, the fate of the NFSD is probably most linked 
the so-called Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (Asgi-SA), which preceded the formation of 
the NFSD. Largely developed in 2005, the Asgi-SA spells out South Africa’s economic growth targets 
for the period until 2014 at a level of 5 % on average per year. In addition to these concrete 
economic growth targets, Asgi-SA comprises social objectives, such as the fight against poverty and 
the reduction of unemployment as major goals (Presidency 2005). As the strategy is issued directly 
by the president and key government departments, the initiative enjoys far more visibility than the 
NFSD
12
. There is no clear reference in Asgi-SA to the sustainable development paradigm, taken up by 
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 T he process is designed to continue with the definition of sustainable development indicators, 
investments in capacity building as well as the development of a fully fledged National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development. 
11
  Priority areas include “sustainable ecosystems and natural resources efficiency”, “economic 
development through investments in sustainable infrastructure” and “enhanced systems for integrated 
planning and implementation”, “sustainable human settlements” and “appropriate responsiveness to 
emerging human development and environmental challenges”. 
12
   The Initiative identifies the major constraints for achieving these goals, such as a volatile South African 
currency, a lacking national logistics systems, skills shortage, barriers to investment in downstream 
industries, ill-directed legislation and deficiencies in state organization capacity and leadership. Based on 
these observations, a number of key interventions are proposed. This includes public sector investment 
(including bulk water infrastructure), industry-focused initiatives (tourism and biofuel production) a 
stronger focus on education and skills development and the elimination of the Second Economy. The 
Initiative furthermore acknowledges that the attainment of these targets requires the buy-in of all social 
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the NFSD. The latter however explicitly proposes the mainstreaming of the identified priority 
challenges in Asgi-SA and related programs. It remains questionable if the relatively new NFSD 
headed by the relatively weak Department for Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and now 
Department of Water and Environmental Affairs
13
 will find equal consideration as the strongly 
promoted Asgi-SA is already serving as the main reference for any growth related discourse and 
activities in the South African context. This is also reflected by the relatively low profile of 
sustainability concerns with other government portfolios, such as the Department of Trade and 
Industry or the Treasury. Hence, various institutional and powerful veto players hinder the 
implementation of the sustainability framework. It is therefore even legitimate to ask, whether the 
government follows and promotes the path of sustainable development itself, or whether the 
approach is rather fragmented and reflected by some rather marginal departments. It might be the 
case that unsustainable practices are merely hidden behind a ‘sustainable development’ rhetoric 
(Büscher 2008). 
 
In addition to these veto players, capacity deficits are also hindering the realization of the NFSD. A 
crucial lack of capacity has been lying with DEAT. It has been the primary custodian of the 
environment and also overseeing the implementation of the right of all South Africans to an 
environment that is not harmful to health and well-being. In this function, DEAT has been responsible 
for administering e.g. the National Framework for Sustainable Development. 
Over the past years, DEAT has been considered a rather weak or junior department, compared to 
senior departments like the Department for Minerals and Energy. As such, it has been criticized for 
simply giving the nod to environmentally controversial projects pushed by industry and those 
departments in favor of those developments (Mail & Guardian, 2007). Hence, NFSD has been left in 
the responsibility of this rather weak department, which does not possess enough own capacities 
and is not expected to develop the necessary clout to create broad-based buy-in from other 
government departments (Fig, 2007).  
This weakness at the national level is then in many cases propagated at lower planning levels, with 
government capacity being noticeably lower at provincial as well as local level (Kranz 2010). At these 
levels, administrations in many cases massively lack the financial, but also human and information 
resources to address complex problems related to implementing policies conducive to sustainable 
development (Swilling 2007, Cloete 2002). Most decisively, there is only limited capacity to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                        
partners, including the national development finance institutions as well as civil society. Asgi-SA makes 
explicit reference to the at times stifling effect of weak and inefficient local planning systems and the 
demanding Environmental Impact Assessment. 
13
  With the formation of the new government in the wake of the 2009 elections DEAT and the Department 
for Water Affairs were re-organized and combined into a new Department of Water and Environmental 
Affairs. 
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an encompassing dialogue with the wide range of societal stakeholders necessary for arriving a 
broadly accepted sustainable solution. 
 
As a result, South Africa is still carrying an almost overwhelming burden of unsustainable practices 
and their ramifications have not yet come to bear. This situation necessitates a fundamental change 
in order to embark on a sustainable trajectory. Is the business community in a position and willing to 
step in and contribute to sustainable development through their own means? 
To begin with, in South Africa unsustainable behavior emanates largely from the business sector. 
Especially the mining industry and related processing industries set a negative record in this regard. 
Apart from substantial ecological impacts, the adverse social impacts of mining companies’ practices, 
especially those related to the migrant labor system, have long been documented (Granville 2001)
14
. 
In terms of the actual mining operations, worker health and safety as well as the issue of human 
rights emerged prominently (Stephens/Ahern 2001). In addition, the severity of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in South Africa is partly attributed to the migrant labor system as well (Elias/Taylor 2001)
15
. 
As Hamann and Bezuidenhout (2007) point out, the impact of mining on social and community 
aspects and its repercussions on the South African society are hard to grasp, rendering an 
assessment of the mining industry’s merits in terms of job creation and economic development 
almost impossible. At the same time the mining industry epitomizes the challenge inherent to 
sustainable development in balancing the environmental, social and economic “pillars”. 
However, there is a paradigm shift currently underway among business towards more responsibility 
with regards to environmental, social and economic issues. This is for example documented through 
the emergence and adoption of new codes and initiatives (DEAT 2008).  
Partly resulting from this situation is a relative maturity of the South African debate on corporate 
social responsibility. This manifests itself in the form of South African corporate governance 
guidelines, such as the King II report
16
. Furthermore South African business players have signed up to 
a number of national and international codes of conducts. A local platform of the UN Global Compact 
has been installed and international certification schemes, such as ISO 14001, find broad application, 
particularly with the more export-oriented industries in South Africa (Bezuidenhout, Fig, Hamann, & 
                                                 
14
   These comprise impacts at the actual mining site as well as repercussions in the sending areas, i.e. the 
home regions of the mine workers Banerjee (2001). 
15
   HIV/AIDS is particularly prevalent in the informal mine settlements, partly due to prostitution. Upon 
returning to their home areas, workers transmit the disease to their wives, thus contributing to a high 
prevalence of the disease. 
16
  The King report was issued by the Institute of Directors and represents a formal review of South African 
corporate governance guidelines and arrangements. It addresses financial as well as non-financial 
reporting criteria pertaining to health and safety practices, environmental governance as well as social 
investment (Malan, 2007). South African companies make use of the King code and in some cases also 
other internationally promoted reporting schemes, such as the GRI to report on their responsibility 
performance (Du Plooy, 2006). 
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Omar, 2007). There is a growing awareness for the notion of corporate responsibility among South 
African business, as well as an interest in more guidance from side of government with regards to 
CSR (Du Plooy, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the discourse on the manifestations of CSR in the South African context continues with 
view to the needs of an emerging economy, while also taking up tendencies from the global debates. 
For example, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development helped to spur the debate on 
corporate responsibility among the South African business community by showcasing activities of 
international business. The criticism of national and international NGOs of business practices ‘close 
to home’ has been another impact of the Summit that activated a national discussion (Bezuidenhout 
et al., 2007). Currently, international politics and policies seeking to address climate change are 
receiving considerable attention among the South African business community. The development on 
climate change is seen as a risk and an opportunity at the same time (Du Plooy, 2006). This indicates 
that South African businesses are susceptible to the international CSR discourses. 
 
Current research addresses the effects of current corporate sustainability and responsibility 
approaches and practices. Fig (2005) argues, that in some cases such initiatives are utilized in order 
to ‘manufacture amnesia’ and cover-up past malpractices. In fact, business practices in many 
instances remain fundamentally unsustainable, leading among other impacts to an overutilization of 
water resources, massive climate-relevant emissions as well as the propagation of social injustice. 
Positive developments are emerging in some instances and selected industry sectors, such as the 
automotive industry, the food and beverage sector, textile industry (Börzel et al. 2010) and even in 
the mining industry (Kranz 2010) as well as other sectors based on the extractive industries. Further 
research into the respective motivations for this behaviour however has revealed that next to an 
inherent motivation due to resource constraints and possibly also international sustainability 
discourses as well as brand awareness, government intervention in terms of providing a clear 
guidance with regard to sustainable development is of the essence (Kranz 2010). 
This brings us back to earlier considerations with view to veto payers and capacities at government 
level, which emerge as decisive factors in implementing the international norm of sustainable 
development in the national context. 
Conclusion and Outlook  
This brief case study of South African sustainable development politics shows how the 
implementation of policies that are in accordance with an internationally recognized norm is 
hindered by national veto players and the lack of capacities to enforce decisions and regulations. 
Competing governmental actors prevail over DEAT’s and its successor institution’s agendas. One 
reason for this is that policies pursued by other players are insufficiently congruent with the 
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sustainability agenda and that there is little effort with regard to improving the alignment of 
different, however relevant and also related portfolios. Other reasons are the insufficient resources 
allocated to DEAT and corresponding department at lower administrative levels. Thus, the number of 
veto players, but also their relatively greater weight, are obstacles for a successful implementation. It 
is therefore a combination of competing players and a lack of capacities that impede change. 
Also does business not fill this implementation gap. Even though corporate sustainability and 
corporate social responsibility programmes are in vogue, business is still doing more harm than 
benefiting social and environmental development. Hence, in the case of South Africa business is not 
able to replace governmental implementation of a public policy framework in the field of sustainable 
development (yet). 
Market incentives are not enough to trigger extensive sustainability efforts and incoherent policy 
making of different government departments as well as the actual resource allocation impede the 
creation of a framework which effectively determines the development trajectory. Still, due to their 
potential, companies could positively contribute to sustainable development in a stronger national 
framework and although budget choices might underlie certain constraints policy coherence and 
coordination could be improved.  
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